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Abstract 
 
The post-war „consensus‟ on welfare was based largely in the perceived agreement of 
leading politicians of Conservative and Labour parties on the role of the mixed 
economy and the welfare state. However, from the late 1970s economic and 
demographic pressures and ideological challenges, particularly from the New Right, 
led to cuts in spending on welfare, increased private involvement and an emphasis on 
more individualistic and selectivist approaches to provision. Recently some scholars 
have begun to discuss the emergence of a „new liberal consensus‟ around welfare 
provision. 
 
Drawing upon interviews with ten per cent of the House of Commons, this article 
examines the extent to which a new political consensus upon welfare can be 
identified. In addition to analysing responses to questions upon welfare issues it 
considers the extent to which MPs themselves believe there to be some degree of 
consensus in approaches to welfare. It also considers whether any consensus exists 
merely in the political language used in relation to welfare issues, or whether there is 
a more substantive convergence. 
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MPs’ attitudes to welfare: A new consensus? 
 
The period from 1945 until the late 1970s has frequently been depicted as being 
marked by a broad degree of political consensus in a range of policy areas. The broad 
parameters of this „consensus‟ are commonly conceived to encompass: commitment 
to a mixed economy, full employment, conciliation of the trade unions, state welfare 
provision, and foreign policy (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994). In the field of welfare 
this implied a general acceptance of broadly social democratic ideals including: a 
commitment to the maintenance of large government agencies, most notably the NHS, 
to provide welfare services to meet a range of social needs free at the point of 
demand; continued expansion of state welfare provision as the economy grew; and a 
commitment to maintaining low levels of unemployment through Keynesian 
economic policies (for example, Lowe, 2005; Thane, 1982; Pierson, 1991). From 
1945 to the late 1970s, while support for the welfare state was the subject of periodic 
intra-party debate, and the boundaries of state provision waxed and waned (mainly the 
former), the principles of the „classic‟ welfare state were upheld by governments of 
either political hue and enjoyed widespread public support (Lowe, 1999; Timmins, 
1995). Although the extent of welfare provision changed as new social problems 
emerged or priorities shifted, changes, as Peter Taylor-Gooby (1991: 23) observes, 
were mainly at the margins, „the core of the state welfare provision went largely 
unchallenged, either from left or right‟.  
 
 This broad consensus was put under increasing strain in the 1970s as 
stagnating economic growth led to rising unemployment, and demographic pressures 
created by an ageing population led to new and expansive patterns of demand for 
welfare provision. The Conservative government elected in 1979, influenced by New 
Right thinking, was committed to reducing the role of the state, promoting the private 
sector, and introducing free-market principles in the state sector. The Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, rejected the politics of consensus in favour of conviction, openly 
dismissing consensus as „the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and 
policies‟ (Seldon, 1994: 502). The neo-liberal policies of the Thatcher government, 
led many observers to proclaim the end of the post-war consensus. In 1990, Dennis 
Kavanagh, the most notable and consistent obituarist for consensus politics, described 
how Thatcher had either wholly or in part dismantled all the main „planks‟ of the 
post-war consensus. At the same time, he observed, the emergence of the New Right 
was matched by a „new left‟ as the Labour party shifted to the left in response to 
Thatcherite policies, and a „new centre‟ as the newly created SDP sought to occupy 
the vacant centre ground (Kavanagh, 1990).  
 
The decline of consensus politics under Margaret Thatcher coupled with the 
opening of archival material related to post-war policymaking, led some to question 
whether a post-war consensus had ever existed (Pimlott, 1988; Jones and Kandiah, 
1996). Nevertheless, consensus has remained an enduring and appealing concept 
(Addison, 1993; Hickson, 2004). Reviewing the consensus debate in 1994, following 
the removal of Thatcher, and shortly after the election of Tony Blair to the Labour 
leadership, Anthony Seldon (1994: 512) identified a new degree of „policy 
convergence‟ between the Labour and Conservative front-benches, which he 
suggested had brought them „closer on many issues than at any point since the 1970s‟. 
Significantly, Seldon attributed much of this convergence to changes in party 
leadership. John Major, he observed, embraced a form of Conservatism much closer 
 3 
to the One-Nation Conservatism of Butler, Macmillan and Heath than the neo-
liberalism of Thatcher, while Kinnock, Smith and Blair had each sought to shift the 
Labour party towards a more centrist position. Seldon, however, remained sceptical 
about the degree to which the broad areas of agreement between the leadership of the 
two main parties reflected the views of the bulk of the parliamentary parties. 
Consequently, while expressing confidence that consensus would continue to be a 
dominant feature of British politics in the twenty-first century, Seldon stopped short 
of proclaiming the emergence of a new consensus (Seldon, 1994). 
 
Seldon‟s caution was born at least in part out of uncertainty as to whether a 
future Labour government might continue on a centrist course or feel constrained to 
return to the radicalism of the early 1980s. It is perhaps not surprising then that since 
New Labour‟s election in 1997, debate about the emergence of a new consensus has 
intensified. While the New Labour government elected in 1997 was committed to 
increased welfare spending there was to be no return to a notional Golden Age of 
universal welfare provision. Although the pressures of mass unemployment have 
declined, the demands of pensions and healthcare for an ageing population continue to 
place considerable strain on the welfare state. These continued demographic 
pressures, coupled with pressures from the global economy to drive down taxes and 
regulation, have led to a fundamental shift in Labour party thinking regarding the 
principle of universal welfare provision. In office New Labour followed many of the 
policies of the previous Conservative government, including spending restraint, the 
importation of market principles into the state sector, and emphases on selectivity, 
individual responsibility and the role of work incentives in relation to benefits 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2001).  
 
 The policies of the New Labour government, particularly in the field of 
welfare, have led some to suggest that since 1997 policy convergence has transformed 
into a new consensus between the main parties. Michael Williams (2000) a former 
Whitehall civil servant, proclaimed the emergence of a new consensus about the role 
of the state in the 1990s. Nowhere was the new consensus better captured, Williams 
argued, than in approaches to welfare, where consensus was driven by the need for 
national competitiveness in a global economy. This was to be achieved in part by 
fundamental reform of the welfare state aimed at containing public spending; shifting 
the balance towards services used by most of the electorate; controlling demands on 
welfare by encouraging claimants to enter the labour market; and modernising public 
services to raise productivity (Williams, 2000). Focusing in detail on welfare, Peter 
Taylor-Gooby (2001) has made a similarly convincing case for a new „liberal‟ 
consensus on welfare. Like Williams, Taylor-Gooby explains welfare reform in the 
UK as a response to labour-market change, demography and globalisation, but also 
emphasises the electoral imperatives of Britain‟s two-party system in which parties 
„tend to diverge while seeking an electorally viable solutions to problems, but 
converge on the “middle ground” when a solution that attracts support is found‟. That 
solution, Taylor-Gooby suggests, involves widespread agreement on the retrenchment 
of spending, the promotion of privatisation in key areas, notably pensions, the 
targeting of benefits through means testing and other restrictions, and the importance 
of labour market activation through incentives, training and what is effectively 
workfare (Taylor-Gooby, 2001: 169). However, while Taylor-Gooby and others have 
identified a broad degree of policy convergence, Lowe has highlighted continued 
tensions within the main parties over the movement towards consensus. In particular, 
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Lowe highlights a sustained debate within the Conservative Party over the extent to 
which the welfare state should be dismantled, while also suggesting that the Labour 
party has been split by a more fractious debate over the extent to which the role of the 
market should be enhanced in a range of welfare policy areas. Such tensions, Lowe 
suggests, are not sufficient to invalidate the concept of consensus, but arise from the 
fact that the two parties have converged from very different ideological positions 
(Lowe, 2005: 433). These tensions are nevertheless significant and suggest that the 
movement towards consensus is as much a source of debate within the main parties as 
between them.  
 
 This article examines the extent to which a new political consensus upon 
welfare can be identified within the House of Commons, using data derived from a 
series of face-to-face interviews with MPs, carried out between October 2004 and 
August 2005. The article seeks to analyse MPs‟ responses to questions about the role 
of the state in welfare, and also considers the extent to which MPs themselves believe 
there to be some degree of consensus in approaches to welfare. It examines whether 
this consensus exists merely in the political language used in relation to welfare 
issues, or whether there is a more substantive convergence. It focuses on the level of 
intra-party debate on welfare provision, the future of the welfare state and the welfare 
policies of the New Labour government since 1997.  
 
 This research builds upon work undertaken by Bochel and Taylor-Gooby 
which surveyed MPs‟ attitudes to welfare in the late 1980s, at a similar stage in the 
life of the Thatcher government (Taylor-Gooby and Bochel, 1988; Bochel, 1992). 
Such detailed research on MPs‟ attitudes and opinions is notoriously difficult to 
conduct. Any attempt to construct a representative sample of Parliamentary opinion, 
is largely dependent upon the willingness of MPs to agree to lengthy face to face 
interviews (Lilleker, 2003). Nevertheless, this research is based upon a sample of 
Parliamentary opinion which is broadly representative of the House of Commons as a 
whole, according to a number of criteria. Sixty-eight MPs were interviewed, a sample 
comprising ten per cent of the House of Commons balanced for party representation, 
(32 Labour; 21 Conservative; 10 Liberal Democrat; 2 SNP; 2 Plaid Cymru, 1 
Independent). Those interviewed reflected a broad range of Parliamentary experience, 
including MPs elected to Parliament between 1970 and 2005, and comprised current 
and former Ministers, select committee members and chairs, experienced 
backbenchers, and MPs newly elected to Parliament in 2005. While the small 
numbers involved make cohort analysis difficult, the sample is broadly in line with 
the composition of the House of Commons, not only in party terms, but also, for 
example, with 51 per cent of participants elected since the 1997 general election, 
compared with 61 per cent of the Commons as a whole, and 24 per cent of the sample 
being women, compared with a figure of 20 per cent of the current House.  
 
 The survey took the form of semi-structured interviews, with open-ended 
questions designed to allow MPs to respond in their own terms to broad questions 
relating to the role of government in welfare, and more structured questions on 
specific issues, for example paying for welfare, which allowed for closer 
comparability of responses. In an effort to militate against MPs merely reciting the 
party line, the interviews were conducted on a confidential basis, and MPs were 
encouraged to articulate their personal attitudes and beliefs. Whilst it is impossible to 
determine the degree to which individual MPs were speaking with absolute candour, 
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the success of this approach may in part be revealed by the number of MPs from all 
parties who were prepared to express opinions at variance with party policy. 
However, it should also be recognised that MPs within the same party tend to share 
the same beliefs and values, and more often than not will support the general party 
line, not because they feel they have to, but because it coincides with their personal 
beliefs (Cowley, 2005).  
 
What do we mean by consensus? 
 
An examination of consensus politics in Britain not only involves consideration of the 
content of that consensus, but also raises questions about the nature of consensus 
itself. What is meant by consensus? To whom does it apply, and how does one 
identify it?  
 
 The definition of consensus in many respects defines individual positions in 
the consensus debate. Ben Pimlott, perhaps the most cogent critic of the idea of a 
post-war consensus, adopted a particularly broad and value-laden definition for which 
he not surprisingly found few examples in British post-war politics. Consensus, 
Pimlott argued, is a powerful and emotive term, which means more than mere 
agreement. „Consensus,‟ he asserted, „is said to exist not when people merely agree, 
but when they are happy agreeing, are not constrained to agree, and leave few of their 
number outside the broad parameters of their agreement‟ (Pimlott, 1988: 130). 
Moreover, Pimlott suggested that consensus carries with it a value element. It is a 
positive thing, to be sought after and cherished: „people seek to “embrace”, “capture” 
and “influence” the consensus and are proud to claim possession of it‟ (1988: 130). 
After positing such a harmonious definition of political consensus it is hardly 
surprising that he concluded that the idea of the British post-war consensus is little 
more than a myth. 
 
 In contrast, other observers of post-war politics have employed a more limited 
definition of consensus, which allows for broad areas of agreement within an 
adversarial political system. In influential work published in the 1960s, Samuel Beer 
(1965) was one of the first to identify a broad „policy convergence‟ between the 
Labour and Conservative parties, whilst conceding the existence of marked 
differences between the main parties in the values which underpinned those policies 
(Seldon, 1994). This more limited definition of consensus as policy convergence or 
what David Marquand terms, „the philosophy of overlap‟, has been widely embraced 
(Marquand, 1988). The principal value of this interpretation is that it allows for a 
substantial measure of party political debate. Kavanagh and Morris, for example, take 
issue with Pimlott‟s use of consensus, „as a synonym for cross-party agreement‟, 
asserting that it is better understood as agreement on a broad framework, within which 
party disagreement would take place: „A set of parameters which bounded a set of 
policy options regarded… as administratively practicable, economically affordable 
and politically acceptable‟ (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994: 13). These parameters, they 
argue, merely served to contain the debate, but within them, disagreements were as 
fiercely contested as ever. Similarly, with regard to welfare, Thane recognised the 
existence of a broad consensus, but suggested that the post-war Labour government 
„used its majority to push the consensus further towards its limits than might have 
been expected of a Conservative government‟ (1982: 267). 
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 This balancing of consensus and conflict is also integral to debate over the 
locus or extent of political consensus in Britain. Pimlott‟s suggestion that any 
consensus should be broadly inclusive has been widely contested by those who have 
sought to explain debate both within and between parties. Anthony Seldon suggests 
three distinct groups for the location of political consensus: party supporters; 
Whitehall officials; and party elites when in office. Popular consensus among party 
supporters, Seldon suggests is the most easily contested. There is, he argues little 
evidence for consensus between grassroots Labour and Conservative supporters; 
rather the further one moves from the party leadership the greater the degree of 
conflict between the parties. Seldon does however concede that for much of the post-
war period there was considerable popular support for state welfare provision, and 
Rodney Lowe in particular has strongly argued that public demands for social security 
and full employment were widespread and identifiable features of post-war Britain 
(Seldon, 1994; 505; Lowe, 2005). There is greater support for the idea of consensus 
among Whitehall officials. Public choice theory and the burgeoning literature on the 
civil service has long suggested that the continuity provided by the civil service is at 
the heart of the post-war consensus. Detailed historical research by writers such as 
Addison (1975) has provided strong evidence for „a Whitehall consensus‟, while 
Marxist critiques have suggested that consensus was manufactured by senior civil 
servants as a means of incorporating the Labour movement into the hegemonic values 
of the state (for example, Miliband, 1983). However, perhaps the most enduring 
interpretation is the idea of consensus among party elites. This interpretation, stressed 
by Kavanagh and Morris, suggests that when in office party leaderships naturally 
gravitate towards the political centre ground and embrace consensual policies 
designed to retain parliamentary and electoral support. This view also allows for 
substantial differences between the anti-consensual statements of parties when out of 
office and policies pursued when elected, and differences of opinion between party 
leaderships and their backbenchers (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994). 
 
MPs’ attitudes to welfare: the role of the state in welfare 
 
In order to determine the degree of political consensus on welfare, MPs were asked a 
series of questions designed to reveal their general attitudes towards the role of the 
state in welfare provision, what might loosely be called their philosophy of welfare, 
and more structured questions on specific aspects of welfare policy. Their replies 
were compared with data from Taylor-Gooby and Bochel‟s survey of 1986-7 in an 
effort to determine whether any shift in parliamentary political opinion had occurred 
over the past two decades, and whether that shift represented a movement towards a 
new consensus on welfare.  
 
While Taylor-Gooby and Bochel were not able to compare their findings with 
comparable research on MPs‟ attitudes to welfare at the time of the perceived post-
war consensus in the 1950s and 1960s, their research supported the widely held view 
that there had been a fundamental breakdown in the political consensus on approaches 
to welfare in the 1980s. On the broad philosophical question regarding the role of the 
state in welfare, Taylor-Gooby and Bochel found an absence of consensus, and 
identified a strong division on party lines (Table 1). Conservatives tended to favour a 
minimalist state that would concentrate its activities on meeting basic needs targeted 
at a small proportion of the population frequently described as the „deserving‟ poor. 
The most popular description of the role of the state, used unprompted by three-
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quarters of Conservative MPs interviewed by Taylor-Gooby and Bochel, was that of a 
„safety-net‟. In contrast, Labour MPs were much more inclined to see the ideal role of 
the state as providing universal services of a high standard, and a substantial minority 
took the argument beyond universal provision and argued that the state should pursue 
policies designed to provide equality through redistribution. The SDP/Liberal group 
comprised only a small part of Taylor-Gooby and Bochel‟s sample; they tended to 
favour a high national minimum level of provision, but this was tempered by a 
concern for the preservation of community and was not necessarily seen as being 
universal in nature (Bochel, 1992). 
 
TABLE 1. MPs’ views on the role of the state in welfare, 1986-7, (Bochel, 1992) 
(percentage of responses by party). 
 Labour Conservative Liberal/SDP 
Safety-net/to meet genuine need only 0 70 0 
To support the extension of private 
welfare 
0 14 0 
To ensure a high national minimum 
in an agreed range of services 
56 9 75 
To meet need 12 0 0 
To redistribute/advance equality 29 0 0 
It depends what the country can 
afford 
3 2 25 
Number 43 34 4 
 
When asked the same question in the current survey, although MPs continue 
to be divided broadly on party lines, there has been a marked movement towards the 
centre on the part of the three main parties (Table 2). In broad terms Conservative 
MPs continue to support a more minimalist perception of the role of the state, with 
considerable support for private provision. Similarly, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
MPs continue to favour a more collectivist approach to welfare. However, a large 
proportion of Labour MPs (47 per cent) now suggested a new role for the state in 
welfare; these MPs supported the idea of a broad state safety-net, but augmented this 
with the idea that once individuals were caught in the safety-net it was the state‟s 
responsibility to propel them quickly back into work. They described the role of the 
state as, „more pro-active‟, „as an enabler‟, or „a mechanism to lift people out of 
poverty‟. While this view was based partly on a belief that for a host of reasons the 
well-being of individuals is improved through employment, it was primarily a 
question of cost. As one Labour MP observed, „the notion of the passive recipient of 
benefit is no longer valid, apart from anything else large numbers of people on benefit 
place too much pressure on the economy‟. This idea of the welfare state as an 
enabling mechanism, which featured so prominently in the current survey, did not 
feature at all in MPs‟ responses to Taylor-Gooby and Bochel‟s survey. Support for 
this more active and selective approach to welfare has, not surprisingly, grown at the 
expense of support for a high level of universal provision, although support among 
Labour MPs for redistribution remains relatively high. A similar shift in attitudes may 
be discerned among Liberal Democrat MPs. Although Taylor-Gooby and Bochel did 
not speak to many Liberal/SDP MPs in 1986-7, their results indicated strong support 
for a high national minimum level of welfare provision. In the present survey Liberal 
Democrat support for universal provision remains high, but a significant proportion of 
Liberal Democrat MPs have now embraced the idea of the welfare state as an 
enabling mechanism. 
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It is not only those on the left who have changed their views, Conservative 
MPs have also moved towards the centre. A significantly smaller proportion of 
Conservative MPs (33 per cent), now believe the government should  provide only a 
safety net for those in the most need, compared with the position in the 1980s (70 per 
cent). There has also been a movement away from support for the extension of private 
provision in favour of a role for the state in working with a number of other providers 
including charities as a means of addressing welfare challenges such as child and 
pensioner poverty. Thus, while there is still strong support for a minimalist approach 
to state provision, a significant minority of Conservative MPs now support a more 
active role for the state in improving people‟s lives. This group of MPs, which 
includes former Ministers from both the Thatcher and Major governments and current 
Conservative front-benchers, spoke about the role of government in building 
communities and improving life-chances, in some respects coming close to Labour 
MPs‟ views of the state‟s enabling role. Several went out of their way to dissociate 
themselves from Thatcherite philosophies, explicitly declaring that „there is such a 
thing as society‟ and that „people are social animals, not atomised individuals‟. A 
number stressed the importance of combating poverty, particularly among children 
and pensioners, but were nevertheless keen to stress that the welfare state should not 
merely hand-out money but should encourage people to help themselves. This 
emphasis on what more than one Conservative MP termed „tough love‟, in which 
welfare provision is necessary but „handing out pounds is not enough‟, has brought 
the views of Conservative and Labour MPs increasingly into alignment. 
 
TABLE 2. MPs’ views on the role of the state in welfare, 2004-5 (percentage of 
responses by party). 
 
Labour Conservative 
Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP/Plaid/ 
Independent 
Total 
% 
Safety-net only for those in the most 
need 
0 33 0 0 10 
To support the extension of private 
provision 
0 24 0 0 7 
Beyond a safety-net to work with 
individuals and the private sector to 
improve lives in a range of sectors 
0 43 0 25 15 
Beyond a safety net to provide a 
mechanism to enable others to lift 
themselves out of poverty/into work. 
47 0 40 0 28 
Provide a national floor above the 
minimum level, for a range of 
services. 
31 0 50 50 26 
Redistribution of wealth - provide 
social justice. 
22 0 10 25 13 
Number 32 21 10 5 68 
 
 
This apparent convergence amongst MPs on the role of the state in welfare 
appears even more pronounced in the analysis of their attitudes towards the nature and 
extent of state involvement, and in particular the role of the state and the private 
sector in the delivery of services. In Taylor-Gooby and Bochel‟s survey there was a 
marked division between Conservative MPs, who believed that the state should 
support the extension of the private sector in welfare provision, and Labour MPs who 
overwhelming supported a high level of state provision. Indeed, Bochel reported that 
no Labour MPs referred to supporting the private sector as part of the state‟s role 
(Bochel, 1992: 54). The current survey indicates a highly significant shift in Labour 
MPs‟ attitudes towards the role of the private sector in welfare provision. When 
 9 
discussing who should be responsible for provision (Table 3), half of Labour MPs 
believed that services should be provided mainly by the state, and half believed that 
there should be a range of providers including the state, private and charitable sector. 
While Labour MPs continue to believe that the state should be the principal financer 
of welfare services there is much less concern about who delivers those services. As 
one Labour MP stated, „the state will take less of a role in providing but maintain its 
role as the funder and a guarantor of quality‟. This represents a marked shift in Labour 
MPs‟ attitudes since the 1980s, and suggests a potentially substantial measure of 
support for the Labour leadership in seeking to expand the role of the private sector in 
welfare provision.  
 
TABLE 3. Who should be responsible for providing welfare services? 
(percentage of responses by party). 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP/Plaid/ 
Independent 
Total 
% 
%% 
Mainly the state 50 0 56 80 37 
A range of providers 
including state, private and 
charitable sectors 
8 35 33 0 20 
The public and private 
sector in partnership 
42 30 11 20 32 
Mainly the private sector 0 35 0 0 12 
Number 26 20 9 5 60 
 
 
This shift contributes to a considerable degree of overlap between all the main 
parties in attitudes towards the provision of services. While there was no cross party 
support for welfare services being mainly provided by the state, a view which no 
Conservatives supported, or for the view that provision should be mainly the 
responsibility of the private sector, a view only supported by Conservative MPs, the 
idea that there should be a range of providers, including the state, private and 
charitable sectors, received substantial support from all the main parties. This 
commitment to diversity in the range of provision, with the emphasis on „what matters 
is what works‟, rather than who provides services and benefits has been central to 
Labour policy on welfare since 1997, and arguably lies at the heart of any new 
consensus on welfare. Although interestingly, a larger proportion of Labour than 
Conservative MPs referred to the public and private sector working in partnership, 
while a much larger proportion of Conservative than Labour MPs referred to the 
charitable sector as a provider of services.  
 
MPs’ attitudes to welfare: paying for welfare 
 
Commitment to diversity in the delivery of welfare is often presented, alongside 
widespread agreement on retrenchment in spending, as part of a new consensus on 
welfare (Taylor-Gooby, 2001). However, while there is some clear evidence of 
consensus on delivery, any consensus on the financing of welfare, at least amongst 
backbench MPs, is somewhat more ambiguous. While there is considerable overlap in 
attitudes towards who should provide services, there remain marked divisions 
between Conservative and Labour MPs regarding the role of the state in the financing 
of such services (Table 4). Whatever their views on the delivery of services, Labour 
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and Liberal Democrat MPs continue to believe that welfare services should be 
financed by the state through general taxation and national insurance. Conservative 
MPs believe that individuals should bear some of the burden of the cost, and a 
significant minority of Conservative MPs (25 per cent) felt that beyond a safety-net 
for those in the most need, the welfare burden should be borne mainly by individuals 
and their families. Moreover, several Conservative MPs stressed that Labour‟s 
welfare policies were too generous and suggested instead significant targeted cuts in 
public spending. 
 
TABLE 4. How do you think welfare services should be financed? (percentage of 
responses by party) 
 
Labour Conservative 
Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP/Plaid/ 
Independent 
Total 
% 
 
By the state through 
general taxation and 
national insurance 
63 0 90 100 51 
Mainly by the state, but 
individuals to take the 
burden in certain sectors. 
37 75 10 0 42 
Beyond a state funded 
safety net -mainly by 
individuals and their 
families 
0 25 0 0 7 
Number 32 20 10 5 67 
 
 
 However, while these results suggest marked divisions between the parties on 
the most appropriate means of paying for welfare, MPs‟ responses to the more vexed 
question of „tax and spend‟ reveal a greater degree of consensus (Table 5). Only 29 
per cent of MPs questioned favoured an increase in taxation to pay for increased 
services, compared to 71 per cent who stated clearly that they would not be in favour 
of such an increase. However, the bulk of those opposed to tax funded increases in 
provision were Conservative MPs, none of whom supported this; while Labour and 
Liberal Democrat MPs were fairly evenly divided, although in both cases the majority 
were opposed to tax increases. Perhaps predictably, in explaining their attitudes 
towards tax funded increases in provision, Labour MPs frequently pointed to the scars 
of eighteen years of opposition, and in particular the memory of the 1992 General 
Election. Interestingly, despite being the only party in recent years to have advocated 
increasing taxes to pay for public services, Liberal Democrat MPs were only slightly 
more supportive of this than Labour MPs. Several MPs from the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties pointed to the effect on incomes of Gordon Brown‟s 2002 budget in 
which national insurance contributions were increased, the redistributive effects of 
which were widely publicised shortly before the 2005 General Election (Brewer et al., 
2005). While generally applauded by Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, it was felt 
by many that this was enough, and that any further demands on the pay packets of the 
public would be unpopular, and electorally damaging. 
 
TABLE 5. Would you be in favour of an increase in general taxation to pay for 
increased welfare provision? (percentage of responses by party). 
 
Lab Cons LD 
SNP/Plaid/ 
Independent 
Total 
% 
Yes 41 0 44 75 29 
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No 59 100 56 25 71 
Number 22 20 9 4 40 
 
 
 Indeed, on the question of paying for welfare, the main lines of consensus 
among MPs lie not so much in whether state funded provision is appropriate, or 
whether tax funded increases in provision are desirable, but whether such tax 
increases are acceptable to the electorate. There was widespread agreement among 
MPs from all parties, irrespective of their personal attitudes towards tax and spending, 
that restraints on taxes and public spending are essential for electoral success. Indeed, 
when asked to outline the main challenges facing the welfare state today, cost set 
against the public desire for lower taxes was the second most popular choice among 
both Labour and Conservative MPs, and was mentioned by more Liberal Democrat 
MPs than any other factor. Significantly, however, „too much state provision‟ which 
was the most popular choice among Conservative MPs was not mentioned as being a 
significant challenge by MPs from any of the other parties. 
 
MPs’ attitudes towards consensus 
 
Finally, it is instructive to consider the extent to which MPs themselves believe there 
to be some degree of consensus in approaches to welfare. MPs‟ responses to this 
question revealed a highly ambivalent attitude towards consensus (Table 6). Only 14 
per cent of MPs were unequivocal in affirming the emergence of a political 
consensus, while a further 41 per cent believed there was some degree of consensus. 
However, a large proportion (45 per cent), believed there to be no consensus at all. A 
closer examination of MPs‟ responses reveals an even greater degree of ambivalence. 
Whilst the majority (55 per cent) believed there to be at least some degree of 
consensus, their responses were generally more varied and ambiguous than those who 
rejected the idea of consensus. MPs who disputed the emergence of a consensus were 
particularly forthright, reverting to entrenched party positions and on occasion 
expressing indignation at the suggestion. This was particularly the case with Labour 
and Conservative MPs. Liberal Democrat MPs as a whole were more sceptical about 
the idea of consensus, with none positively asserting the existence of consensus, and a 
common response among Liberal Democrats was, „if there is a consensus we are not 
part of it‟.  
 
TABLE 6. Do you believe there is a political consensus around general 
approaches to welfare? (percentage of responses by party). 
 
Labour Conservative 
Liberal 
Democrat 
SNP/Plaid/ 
Independent 
Total 
% 
Yes 13 11 0 40 14 
Some consensus on 
objectives/ 
language but not on 
methods 
35 56 60 20 41 
No 52 33 40 40 45 
Number 31 18 10 5 64 
 
 
 There was also a certain amount of scepticism as to whether the appearance of 
agreement on some aspects of welfare marked a genuine movement towards 
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consensus. Several MPs pointed to similarities in the language used about welfare, but 
doubted whether this represented a genuine shift in attitudes. There was a certain 
degree of scepticism about Labour‟s commitment to welfare reform. Several 
Conservative MPs referred to the government‟s reluctance to allow Frank Field to 
„think the unthinkable‟ on welfare reform. The use of the language of reform was, 
according to one Conservative MP, a smokescreen behind which Gordon Brown was 
expanding the „welfare basket‟, or as one Liberal Democrat put it, „madly 
redistributing‟. Indeed, several MPs from all parties expressed the belief that there 
would be a return to more universal provision should Gordon Brown become Prime 
Minister. Similarly, Labour MPs expressed doubts that Conservative commitments to 
combat poverty and unemployment would be sustained in office, and pointed to 
Conservative plans to dismantle the New Deal as evidence of this. 
 
  It was also striking that few MPs readily viewed the pursuit of consensus as 
something to aspire to. Only five MPs, three Labour and two Conservatives, 
expressed the belief that the parties should be actively seeking a new consensus on 
welfare, and only one of these, a Conservative, expressed confidence that this could 
be achieved, stating rather optimistically, „we‟re all completely at one with Frank 
Field now‟, a view markedly not shared on the Labour benches. Many Labour MPs 
were decidedly critical of the movement towards consensus, reluctantly conceding 
that Labour‟s use of the private sector in welfare provision marked the emergence of a 
new consensus but not one with which they were happy, or indeed wished to be part 
of. One Labour MP who was leaving Parliament at the 2005 General Election, was 
harshly critical of competition for the „soggy centre‟ which had stultified debate and 
undermined the welfare state. Indeed, few MPs from any party appeared to conceive 
of consensus as being arrived at by debate and compromise leading to movement on 
the part of all the parties towards some centre ground. Where MPs did recognise some 
consensus it was widely felt that this had been achieved by one party moving towards 
the position of the other. This was particularly evident among those Labour MPs who 
opposed the private sector, and selective provision, and also among Conservative MPs 
who were more inclined to believe that the balance of opinion was moving in their 
direction.  
 
 Nevertheless, some MPs did believe there had been a positive movement on 
the part of the main parties towards a new consensus on welfare and their responses 
suggest that this movement had been broad based and not confined to the party 
leadership. MPs referred to „realignment‟, „movement towards an imaginary middle 
from both sides‟, „a coming together of Tory and New Labour thinking‟, and „a 
realisation that we need to do things differently‟. However, where MPs did identify a 
consensus it was largely related to objectives, and there remained fundamental 
differences of opinion over how to achieve these objectives. There was, for example, 
notable consensus on the need to combat poverty particularly among children and 
pensioners, but disagreements over the means of achieving this, particularly over 
pensions means testing and the operation of tax credits. Similarly, reflecting 
similarities of position as outlined earlier, MPs identified a consensus on the 
importance of propelling people into work, based upon the idea, as one Labour MP 
put it, „that work is normal, being on benefit is not‟. However, there remained areas of 
disagreement over the extent to which Labour‟s policies would achieve this. Many 
Conservative MPs, and a significant number of Liberal Democrat MPs, still felt the 
benefits system was a serious disincentive to work. Even where there was consensus 
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over means, such as the increased use of mixed provision, there remained 
fundamental differences of opinion over how this provision should be managed. Thus, 
for example, while Conservative MPs supported the government‟s attempts to involve 
the charitable sector in welfare provision, they were critical of the fact that from their 
perspective, charities were not being allowed to drive need but were instead being co-
opted to the government‟s agenda.  
 
A new consensus? 
 
In considering whether there has been any development of a new consensus on 
welfare it is important to recognise that whatever the situation in the House of 
Commons it is not clear how far this would extend beyond the three main parties in 
Parliament. Several MPs pointed to what they perceived as differences in attitudes 
between the Parliamentary and constituency parties, with the former generally being 
viewed by MPs as closer to the centre and the latter tending towards less consensual 
approaches to welfare provision. It is also interesting to observe that the shifts in 
attitudes within the three main parties are not reflected in the views of (the admittedly 
small number of) MPs from Plaid Cymru and the SNP, who generally supported a 
high level of universal state provision. This raises questions about the implications of 
such differences for the provision of welfare in Scotland and Wales, and these are 
clearly reinforced by the existence of the National Assembly for Wales and the 
Scottish Parliament, both of which have already deviated from some of the social 
policy positions adopted at Westminster in the relatively short periods of their 
existence. In addition, it is not clear the extent to which the shifts in politicians‟ 
attitudes to the welfare state are reflected in public opinion (Curtice and Fisher, 2003; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2004), a marked feature of the post-war consensus on welfare. 
 
Nevertheless the situation within Parliament remains important for the 
development of social policy, as evidenced by the experiences of both Conservative 
and Labour governments since 1979, and there has clearly been some significant 
movement towards a middle ground in MPs‟ attitudes to welfare and this in turn lends 
some support to the idea that there is an emerging consensus. This is particularly 
evident in any comparison of the attitudes of MPs today with those of the 1980s, a 
period when there was little or no consensus on approaches to welfare. However, if 
there is some return to consensus on welfare it is a new consensus. The post-war 
consensus involved considerable cross party agreement on means: a commitment to 
the mixed economy; the maintenance of full employment through Keynesian 
economic management; and a high level of state welfare provision. There were 
however, fundamental differences of opinion over objectives, with the Labour party 
committed to the redistribution of wealth and the Conservatives seeking a degree of 
intervention sufficient only to be compatible with market efficiency and personal 
initiative (Lowe, 2005). The current survey reveals a significantly different situation 
within Parliament. Labour MPs, aware of the escalating costs of welfare provision, 
have moved away from ideas centred on universal provision towards a more selective 
targeted approach to welfare. At the same time some Conservative MPs, aware of the 
damaging social costs of poverty, have shifted away from a strictly minimal approach 
to welfare towards a more collectivist position, whilst the appetite for tax cuts is 
significantly less than in the 1980s. There is therefore some convergence of attitudes 
on a middle ground defined by financial restraint and the mixed provision of welfare 
services, designed to help those in most need, while enabling others to help 
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themselves. There is now arguably a broad consensus on ends, the elimination of 
poverty particularly among pensioners and children, the movement of people off 
welfare and into work, and the creation of a competitive economy by restraining 
spending and the burden of taxation. There are some areas of consensus on the means 
of achieving this, most notably through a commitment to mixed provision. However, 
there remain fundamental differences relating to the delivery of these objectives, with 
areas of disagreement over issues such as means testing, the minimum wage and tax 
credits. 
 
 Whilst this survey of MPs‟ attitudes does therefore provide some evidence to 
support the work of Taylor-Gooby and others who have suggested the emergence of a 
new consensus on welfare, it is not conclusive. There has clearly been some 
movement of MPs towards a centre ground on welfare, but it is not clear how firm 
this ground is. There is still strong support among backbench MPs for approaches to 
welfare provision which reflect the poles of traditional Labour and Conservative 
values of social justice and minimal state support. A significant proportion of Labour 
MPs (22 per cent) continue to believe that the role of the state should be to 
redistribute wealth, while an even larger proportion of Conservative MPs (33 per 
cent), believe that the state should provide nothing more than a minimal safety-net for 
those in the most need (Table 2). In the case of Labour MPs, support for redistribution 
has changed little since the 1980s when 29 per cent of Labour MPs adopted this 
position (Bochel, 1992). Indeed, many Labour MPs who took part in this survey 
expressed grave misgivings about aspects of Labour‟s programme of welfare reform, 
most notably the involvement of the private sector, and expressed strong opposition to 
the movement towards a new consensus based on selective and mixed provision. This 
is reflected in marked divisions within the Labour party in relation to the financing 
and provision of welfare (Tables 3, 4 and 5). Significantly, these MPs were not 
primarily well-known Labour rebels, but rather were MPs whose voting records are 
solid and which compare favourably with that of the Prime Minister. Similarly, the 
research suggested the existence of a group of Conservative MPs interested in 
developing considerable state support for individuals and communities in need. 
However, these Conservative MPs were themselves unable to estimate the depth of 
support for this position within even the Parliamentary party, although the leadership 
election later in 2005 did help to highlight the existence of such views. In contrast, 
there remained strong support among Conservative MPs for a limited approach to 
welfare. There were powerful arguments about the disincentive nature of state 
provision and, despite the Howard Flight debacle immediately prior to the 2005 
general election, several who called for increased charging or fundamental cuts in 
services. It is likely therefore, that any „new consensus‟ in Parliament will remain 
contestable not only between, but also within parties. 
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